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SEGREGATION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT*
J. D. HYMAN f

Slightly more than 75 years ago, Senator Boutwell said:
"The thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments did limit the power of the
States; they did extend the power of the General Government; and the question we
are considering almost continually is the extent to which the power of the States
has been limited by these amendments and the extent to which the power of the
General Government has been carried by these several amendments."1

However definitively some constitutional problems may have been left
behind, those created by the Civil War Amendments are still before us almost
in the identical terms in which Senator Boutwell stated them. Perhaps the
reason is not so much that they are insoluble as that they have only recently
been receiving adequate consideration.
Their eclipse and emergence can be sketched quickly. In the name of
federalism, the Supreme Court at the outset eviscerated the amendments and
the statutes passed to implement them.2 In a day which hears much talk of
judicial activism, it is not inappropriate to recall how deliberately judicial
power was wielded in what was believed to be a statesmanlike blocking of
political efforts to realize in fact the Christian and humanistic ideals which
were in large part responsible for the Civil War.
But the freedom of the States from federal interference was not longlived. Developing in response to demands wholly different from those which
primarily brought about passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 the concept
of substantive due process thrust the Federal Government deeply into the
affairs of the states, although by way of the judicial veto rather than the
legislative decree. Once fully developed with reference to economic interests,
it was nautral that sooner or later the doctrine should expand to bring personal liberties also under the Supreme Court's protecting wing. This in
turn resulted in a re-examination of the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment
in protecting basic personal rights from infringement otherwise than by the
formal act of the state. That re-examination is continuing, and with particular
urgency on the question of segregation.
In considering basic doctrines which are in flux, one cannot avoid having
some convictions or attitudes about the historical meaning of the Civil War
*This paper is a slightly revised version of an address given at the Public Law Round
Table of the Association of American Law Schools in Chicago, on December 29, 1950.

tProfessor of Law, University of Buffalo.
1. 3 CONG. REc. 1792 (1875).
2. See Watt & Orlikoff, The Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan, 44 ILL.
L. REv. 13 (1949).
3. The notion that the due process clause was smuggled into the Constitution just

to protect corporate interests has been effectively upset. Graham, The "Conspiracy
Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371, 48 YALE L.J. 171 (1938).
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amendments. Fortunately our generation has the benefit of a re-examination
of the historical data. When Mr. Justice Black, to support his position that
4
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the first eight Amendments,
planted himself on Horace Flack's 50-year old study of the making of the
Fourteenth Amendment, that study got the benefit of a new look. Professor
Fairman has given us a powerful briefc challenging the incorporation thesis.
By the way, he has provided us with a comprehensive survey of the views
expressed about the first and fifth clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,
when the Amendment was adopted in Congress and ratified by the States.
Professor Frank has re-examined with care the genesis and contemporary
understanding of the equal protection clause.7 And Mr. Graham has given a
luminous account of the early antecedents of sections 1 and 5 in the
activities of the abolitionists of the mid-west in the 1830's and 1840's.8
From these studies, two conclusions emerge quite clearly. The first is
that the anticipated enlargement of federal power was the heart of the controversy over the adoption of sections 1 and 5. A typical charge was that
section 1 "consolidates everything in one imperial despotism." The second is
that there lay behind section 1 the high idealism of men who, believing
slavery and all that it implied to be incompatible with the Christian ethic as
well as the assumptions of American political life, and finding that their
fellow citizens could not be won to corrective action by evangelical appeal,
deliberately resolved to turn to national political power to achieve their
goals. Mr. Graham's analysis shows how precisely the three-part formulation
of section 1 reflects the ideas painfully ground out of the doctrinal controversies of thirty years earlier.
This review of the history clearly shows that sections 1 and 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment are not properly to be regarded with suspicion,
as parts of a sordid scheme to maintain political power. Rather they represent
the culmination of an idealistic effort to eliminate the degrading concomitants
as well as the bare fact of chattel slavery.
This result should be achieved, if possible, without impairment of the
essence of federalism; this much the whole structure of the Constitution
demands. But if judicial ingenuity falters, and doctrines cannot be found
which give adequate power to effectuate the goals of the Amendment with4. Dissenting, in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed.
1903 (1947).
5. FLACK, THE ADoPTioNz oF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908).

6. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2

STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).

7. Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws,"
50 COL. L. REv. 131 (1950).

8. Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Ansendmient,
1950 Wis. L. REv. 479 & 610.
9. Quoted in Fairman, supra note 6, at 49.
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out sweeping enlargement of federal power, then the historical record shows
that the intent was to give whatever power was needed to accomplish these
goals, not to deny it altogether. There remain, of course, limits of a political
character on the exercise of the power; they have proved to be far from
insignificant.
In Plessey v. Ferguson,'° the Supreme Court in 1896 had to consider the
question whether by enforcing segregation between whites and negroes the
states were denying the equal protection assured by the Fourteenth Amendment. The heart of the Court's argument is contained in two famous sentences: "We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not
by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it."" Of all the ex cathedrapronouncements on nonlegal questions by the Court, this must surely be the most unrealistic as well as the most blighting in its effect on American life. As Mr.
Justice Harlan plainly saw and stated then, and as every person willing to look
must see now, there can be no doubt but that segregation has been enforced as
a means of subordinating the negro.12 Yet fifty years is not a short time,
even in the life of social institutions. Judicial assumptions cannot be dislodged
without giving some consideration to what has been built upon them. Certainly such considerations will be widely urged and courts will have to
reckon with them.
Segregation is, of course, only one facet of the problem of how far the
Fourteenth Amendment goes in the direction of assuring to minority groups
in the United States full standing as human beings and citizens. One related
development that cannot pass without notice is the recent decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the Federal Government has the
power to protect against private invasion the right of persons to assemble to
consider questions of national concern.' 3 This holding merely honors the
promise made 75 years ago in the dictum of the Cruikshank case.' 4 The
dissenting opinion raises questions of statutory construction rather than
constitutional doubts about this degree of encroachment upon state freedom.
Presumably the Supreme Court has granted review in order to settle the
construlction of an important and rather obscurely worded statute. It would
be rather a shock to find that the Federal Government lacked the power
to protect its citizens in the discharge of their duties of citizenship, when
10. 163 U.S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896).
11. Id.at 551.
12.

MYRDAL, AN AmERcCA

DInEmA

575, 581-85 (1944).

13. Hardymnan v.Collins, 183 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1950), 4 VAND. L. REv. 166, cert
granted, 340 U.S. 809 (1950).
14. United States v. Cruiksbank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1875).
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hostile local sentiment led to a failure of police protection. 15 The possibility
of federal intervention in this type of situation would seem calculated to
awaken rather than to deaden local incentive to protect unpopular groups
in their lawful public activities.
A second recent development that has bearing on the segregation problem
is the firm establishment of the doctrine that the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to state officials even when their improper action is unauthorized or
forbidden by state law. The explicit holding to this effect in the Screws case",
has crystallized in a growing number of lower court decisions.' 7 The application of this doctrine, like the one mentioned above, involves an intrusion
by the Federal Government into an area normally regarded as belonging
to the states and their citizens exclusively. The result is surely in harmony
with the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the most that can be
said against the result is that it is possible to read the letter of the Amendment the other way.
A third and closely related development is the holding of the voting
cases' s that the Fifteenth Amendment is invoked when what is clearly a
governmental function is being performed, despite efforts to strip the acting
agency of all formal vestiges of state authority.19 An unresolved issue is the
application of this doctrine when the function is not strictly a governmental
one, but is being performed through the joint efforts of public and private
groups. A state may not, it seems clear, bar negroes from a housing project
which it has constructed, any more than it could bar negroes by ordinance
from portions of the residential land.20 But may a privately financed residential
project which would have been impossible of accomplishment without
substantial state assistance bar negroes? The New York Court of Appeals
said yes, in a case in which a privately owned $90 million redevelopment
project was made possible by the action of New York City in exercising
the condemnation power to assemble the plot, in closing certain streets, and
15. A recent episode of similar character was the disturbance at Peekskill, New York,
August 27 and September 4, 1949. See VIOLENCE IN PEEKSICILL (1950), a report of the
American Civil Liberties Union. The complaint in an action growing out of these events

was sustained in Robeson v. Fanelli, 94 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
16. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 Sup. Ct. 1031, 89 L. Ed. 1495 (1945).
17. See, e.g., Brandhove v. Tenney, 183 F.2d. 121 (9th Cir. 1950), ccrt. granted, 340
U.S. 903 (1950); Campo v. Niemeyer, 182 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1950) ; Williams v. United
States, 179 F.2d 644 and 656 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. granted, 340 U.S. 850 (1950) ; fcShane v. Moldovan, 172 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949) ; Burt v. New York, 156 F.2d 791
(2d Cir. 1946) ; Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945).
18. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 Sup. Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed. 987 (1944) ; Rice

v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948), 1 VAND. L. REv.
645.
19. Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 Sup. Ct. 276, 90 L. Ed. 265 (1946).
20..Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 Sup. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. 149 (1917) ; cf.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948) ; Birmingham
v. Monk, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1950).
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in granting a 25-year tax exemption on the enhanced value of the property.
Three of the seven judges argued powerfully that the answer should be no.
The case authorities are meagre, naturally, because the undertaking is of a
novel character. Yet the issues are vital. Redevelopment laws are on the books
of 25 states. If our cities are to be remade on a grand scale, in a pattern
which will endure for several generations, it would be a major calamity for
segregation in housing to be frozen into the pattern. The argument has been
that private enterprise must be encouraged if redevelopment is to become
a fact. The conclusive answer is that too high a price can be paid for enlisting private enterprise, and that if private enterprise wants to exploit
opportunities for which it needs extensive public aid, it must forego its
prejudices and accept aid on terms that the public itself would have to meet. 2
The failure of the Supreme Court to review the case would be disturbing
if it were not that the broad issue was clouded by the fact that after extended discussion at an earlier stage between New York City and the builder
it had been the City's deliberate decision not to demand a nondiscrimination
clause in the agreement.

In education, as in housing, the limitations on official state action are
sharply in dispute at the present time. Professor Frank's study disclosed that
when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted there was a substantial
cleavage in opinion as to whether or not the equal protection sought to be
guaranteed would exclude racial segregation in education. 23 There was at
least strong opinion that it should. And there can be no doubt that unsegregated education, like other experiences in living, working and playing,
could contribute greatly to the breakdown of the divisive group attitudes
that poison so much of American life today. Yet courts as conscious agencies
of social control cannot ignore the force of entrenched patterns of behaviour,
hallowed by judicial pronouncements of venerable weight. In the light of
present knowledge about society it cannot be doubted that segregated education is incompatible with the kind of equal protection the Fourteenth
Amendment sought to provide. But an abrupt and complete outlawing of
segregated education might be thought by the Supreme Court to create too
violent resistance to be a wise policy, particularly so soon after the first,
belated beginnings of the enforcement of the negro right to vote and of legal
24
pressure on segregation in certain areas.
21. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512-, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
22. Cf. Abrams, Stuyvesant Townv's Threat to Our Liberties, 8 COMMENTARY 426
(Nov. 1949).
23. Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws,"
50 COL. L. REv. 131 (1950).
24. Among the more adequate law review discussions of segregation in education,
see Notes, 49 COL. L. RZv. 629 (1949), 17 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 208 (1949), 3 U. OF
FLA. L. REv. 358 (1950).
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In Sweatt v. Painter2 5 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents206 the
Supreme Court was invited to repudiate forthrightly the untenable dictum
of Plessy. It did not do so, but elected rather to particularize the inherent lack
of equality in segregated education at the professional level. 27 Analogous
reasoning could be employed to produce the same result at each level of the
educational process. And it is not easy to resist the force of the analogy.
Yet the Court may feel that distinctions which can be drawn achieve validity,
if not from logic, then from the differing impact on established patterns
of behaviour and the probable differing degrees of resistance. Certainly if
the Court is to apply the analogies all the way down to and including primary
education, the path will have to be smoothed by a convincing sociological
showing that the common expectation as to the depth of resistance is illfounded.
Even if the Court is unwilling to go all the way, there is an argument,
particularly difficult to answer, against segregation in vocational high
schools. The relationship between such schools and employers would seem to
be so close as to require the conclusion that, as with law students, segregation
in education precludes equal preparation and opportunity for work. If this
conclusion is correct, the status of the segregated state college becomes unclear, even assuming that equality of staff can be established. 28 A possible
distinction would be whether or not the college offers primarily vocational or
cultural training. If the distinction seemed too thin, all secondary and higher
education might be found to be too closely tied in with working opportunities
to permit segregation. That would still leave primary education untouched.
And it is likely that the resistance to enforced association would be at its
greatest in just that area.
However the Court finally chooses among the available paths, it is certain that economic pressure is going to be increasingly exerted against segregation. Dual school systems are expensive if neither can be neglected. And courts
every-where are making continued neglect of the negro school systems im25. 339 U.S. 629, 70 Sup. Ct. 848, 94 L. Ed. 1114 (1950).
26. 339 U.S. 637, 70 Sup. Ct. 851, 94 L. Ed. 1149 (1950). And see the earlier Supreme
Court cases of Missouri ex reL. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 Sup. Ct. 232, 83 L.
Ed. 208 (1938) ; Sipuel v. University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631, 68 Sup. Ct. 299, 92
L. Ed. 247 (1948) ; Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147, 68 Sup. Ct. 389, 92 L. Ed. 604 (1948).
27. Among recent lower federal cases and state cases with similar holdings, see
Wilson v. Board of Supervisors, 92 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. La. 1950) ; Swanson v. Rector
and Visitors of University of Virginia, U.S.D.C., W.D. Va., Sept. 5, 1950, noted in
36 VA. L. REv. 797 (1950) ; Johnson v. Board of Trustees, 83 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Ky.
1949); University of Maryland v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 590, 103 A.L.R. 706
(1936) ; cf. Epps v. Carmichael, 93 F. Supp. 327 (M.D.N.C. 1950) ; State ex rel. Hawkins

v. Board of Control, 47 So2d 608 (Fla. 1950).

28. In Parker v. University of Delaware, 75 A.2d 225 (Del. Ch. 1950), the undergraduate facilities of the University of Delaware and Delaware State College were found
not to be equal, and admittance to the University was ordered. In State cx rel. Tolliver
v. Board of Education, 230 S.W.2d 724 (Mo. 1950), negro and white state teachers'
colleges were held to provide substantially equal facilities. Cf. State ex rel. Hawkins v.
Board of Control, 47 So2d 608 (Fla. 1950), and companion cases.
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possible. Unequal salary scales have been found to be unjustifiably discriminatory 20 and corrective action ordered, although in a Georgia case
federal court relief was held to have been improvidently granted because
of failure to exhaust state administrative remedies 30 The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has required the correction of curricular dificiencies
and facilities for extracurricular work.31 Federal district courts in Arkansas
and Texas have taken similar action. 32 It may be justifiable to allow a certain amount of time to achieve equality.33 But there is no justification for
Judge Atwell's conclusion that additional courses are not to be required for
34
the negro school unless there are as many as ten students for each class.
Two school systems are likely to be uneconomical at best; they become a real
luxury where the negro population is very small. But if curricular opportunities are to be equal, as they clearly must be, this beomes a part of the
necessary cost of segregation. Could white children then complain that their
facilities were unequal because of the larger classes? There would seem
to be no logical answer to such a complaint, if it should be presented for
judicial consideration.
Apart from the economic pressure exerted by an honest insistence on
equality, the application of the "separate but equal" doctrine to schools raises a
difficult theoretical problem. In his dissent in the District of Columbia case,
Judge Edgerton argued forcefully that equality is impossible of achievement as long as there is segregation.3 5 His premise was the unassailable one
that the equality guaranteed by the Constitution is individual equality. This
proposition underlies the holding in Shelley v. Kraemer.36 The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals has also stressed that since the protected rights are indi29. Freeman v. County School Board, 82 F. Supp. 167 (E.D. Va. 1948) aff'd mnem.,
171 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1948) ; cf. Whitmyer v. Lincoln Parish School Board, 75 F. Supp.

686 (W.D. La. 1948).
30. Cook v. Davis, 178, F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1949) cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950);
cf. East Coast Lumber Terminal v. Babylon, 174 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1949).
31. Carter v. School Board, 182 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1950) ; Corbin v. County School
Board, 177 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1949).
32. Butler v. Wilemon, 86 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1949); Pitts v. Board of
Trustees, 84 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Ark. 1949). But not all suits have been successful.
See Carr v. Corning, 182 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
33. Cf. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351-52, 59 Sup. Ct. 232,
83 L. Ed. 208 (1938) ; Pitts v. Board of Trustees, 84 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Ark. 1949);
Wrighten v. Board of Trustees, 72 F. Supp. 948 (E.D.S.C. 1947).

34. Butler v. Wilemon, 86 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1949) ; see McCabe v. Atchison,
T. & S.F.R.R., 235 U.S. 151, 35 Sup. Ct. 69, 59 L. Ed. 169 (1914). In Brown v. Ramsey,
185 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1950), the court stated that instruction offered in the white
schools had to be available to qualified negro students, however few. But the court held
that none of the plaintiffs had standing to raise this point. In State ex rel. Brewton v.
Board of Education, 233 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1950), a negro high school student not offered
a course in aeromechanics in his high school was held entitled to admission to the
white high school.
35. Carr v. Coming, 182 F.2d 14, 22, 32-33 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; cf. Mendez v. Westminister School District, 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946), aff'd on other grounds, 161
F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
36. 334 U.S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948), 2 VAND. L. Rav. 119.
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vidual and personal, compliance with the constitutional requirement cannot
be established by averaging facilities throughout the community.A7
Since the Constitution requires individual equality, the question arises
as to the standard for determining equality: against whom is a given child to
be measured? Presumably against the actual or hypothetical child similarly
situated in respects relevant to school attendance such as age, ability and
previous education. If the hypothetical child, being white, would have better
facilities than the child in question, it would seem that there is a denial of
equal protection. If the range of negro schools is equal to the range of white
schools, then, on the facts thus far stated, the white child does not have
better facilities.3 8 But if the factor of residential location is added to the
elements being considered, the problem changes. Then individual equality is
denied so long as the white child in the same area has better school facilities.
But if the negro and white schools in the same area are substantially equal, it
would seem to be immaterial that white schools elsewhere are superior. Since
segregated patterns of dwelling are still the fact, this conclusion would seem
to permit inferior schools for negroes. On the other hand, if the over-all
school facilities for the two groups must be equal, improvement in negrb
school facilities would seem to be a more a likely consequence.
These problems did not confront the Supreme Court in the Shelley and
Sweatt cases when they declared that the right to equal facilities was an individual one. In the Shelley case, the asserted equality lay not in the
availability of accommodations equal to those being purchased, but merely
equality in legal opportunity similarly to exclude others. In the Sweatt case,
as in the Canadacase,3 9 the issue involved the adequacy of facilities considered
on a state-wide basis, without reference to the residential location of applicants. Considering these elements of difference, the Court may define the
required equality in educational facilities in terms of the facilities available
40
in the community as a whole.
37. Corbin v. County School Board, 177 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1949).
38. If all white schools in a community were identical, the test of the equality of
negro schools would be the same on an individual or an averaging basis. But it is
assumed that the quality of white schools in any large urban community varies considerably. Proof that this variation was the result of a deliberate practice of favoring the more
well-to-do segments of the community would presumably support a claim of denial of
equal protection. But the burden of proof would seem to be insurmountable; hence the
determination of the equality of the negro schools is considered in the light of the stated
assumption that white schools do vary.
39. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 Sup. Ct. 232, 83 L. Ed.

208 (1938).

40. It has been held that a plan for regional education does not meet the requirements
of equal protection even though the out-of-state regional school is superior to the state
school. McCready v. Byrd, 73 A.2d 8 (Md. 1950) cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950) ;
see Notes, 1 VAND. L. REv. 403 (1948), 13 Mo. L. REv. 286 (1948); cf. Missouri e.€.
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 Sup. Ct. 232, 93 L .Ed. 208 (1938).
On the right of educational institutions not publicly owned, to exclude negroes,
and the effect of state contributions, compare Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d
212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945), with Norris v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948).
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A very similar problem is involved in the question of negro access to
public recreational facilities. In Lopez v. Seccombe,41 the federal district
court in California merely enjoined discriminatory exclusion of Mexicans
from the San Bernardino swimming pool. There was no suggestion of other
facilities being available. In a case recently arising in Baltimore, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an action against
city officials grounded upon segregation of athletic activities in the city's public
parks and playgrounds. The petitioners there refrained from contending that
equal facilities were not offered. 42 A district court recently issued an injunction against the exclusion of negroes from the sole municipally-operated
swimming pool. 43 The court rejected as unsound the argument of the city
that a proposal to build a swimming pool in the negro section of the city
at some future time was a present answer to petitioners' assertion of their
constitutional rights.
Thus far the problem is relatively simple; it is like the school situation
considered on a city-wide basis. Complications arise when the single facility
is offered exclusively for the use of different groups at different hours of
the day and on different days of the week. This solution was suggested by a
district court in upholding the arrangements for Baltimore's municipal golf
course44 and, as adopted by the city of Miami, was upheld by the Florida
Supreme Court.45 The United States Supreme Court has recently told the
Florida Supreme Court to re-examine the question in the light of McLaurin.46
No doubt individual equality is not achieved by temporal segregation if
the time intervals are substantial. As they become less substantial, the discrimination approaches the trivial, as, for example, in the case of tennis
courts available to the two races on alternate hours. It is not trivial in the
Florida case, where proportionate demand by the two races was the ostensible
test, resulting, at the time of the suit, in negroes being allowed to use the
golf course one day a week, whites, six days. Time is certainly a factor in
considering the availability of accommodations, and where the discrepancy is
as great as here, negroes as a class simply do not have equal facilities for golfing. The Florida court's suggestion that the system was self-correcting because increased demand by negroes would increase the number of days
41. 71 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
42. Boyer v. Garrett, 183 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1950); cf. Winkler v. Maryland, 69
A.2d 674 (Md. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 919 (1950). See Harper & Rosenthal, What
the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Ternt--An Appraisal of Certiorari,99 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 293, 310 (1950).
43. Draper v. St. Louis, 92 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Mo. 1950) ; cf. Lawrence v. Hancock,
76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W. Va. 1948).
44. Law v. Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 346 (D. Md. 1950).
45. Rice v. Arnold, 45 So.2d 195 (Fla. 1950), cert. granted, 340 U.S. 848 (1950).
46. In taking certiorari, the Court remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court
"for reconsideration in the light of subsequent decisions of this Court," in Sweatt and
McLaurin. 340 U.S. 848.
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allotted to them seems unrealistic, because negroes may not be in a position
to make their demands known by putting in an appearance on the prescribed
day.
The obvious next question is what happens when equal facilities are
offered, but at places substantially separated in space. In the St. Louis
swimming pool case, the district judge said, referring to the proposed future
swimming pool for negroes: "Even when completed such a pool may
mitigate discrimination, but it will not validate it as to other sections of the
City."' 47 Assuming the pools to be physically equal, or substantially so, any
negro has the same opportunity that any white has to go swimming. But if the
factor of residence location is included, and if transportation time be regarded as a material factor in considering the availability of facilities, then
negroes near the white swimming pool are discriminated against, as are whites
near the negro swimming pool. One answer is to say that transportation
is not a material factor. That answer is hardly honest, at least for the
cases in which the travel time is very great. Suppose, then, the negro swimming
pool were put near the white one. This element of difference would disappear; equality would be achieved at the expense of inconvenience for the
negroes. Here, as in the case of school facilities, if segregation continues to
be allowed in theory, it might be wiser to make the determination of substantial equality without reference to the residential location of individual
persons entitled to use the facilities. If the average equivalence test is used,
then facilities for negroes would apparently have to be located in somewhat
the same relationship to the center of negro population that the white
facilities bear to the white center of population.
These complexities emphasize the inherent defects of the proposition that
segregated facilities can be equal. But unless the Court is ready to reject
the proposition directly, it is not likely to permit itself to be driven to that
result by logical extension of the ruling that the protected constitutional
rights are individual rights. And to press the logic of the ruling too far may
only result in hindering the effort to achieve practical equality. 48
Thus far, the problems discussed have involved some immediate action
by, or attributed to, the state which establishes the discrimination. At least
as significant are those cases in which the attempt to discriminate is made
without compulsion of state law by a person who is not an official of the state.
Private discrimination in the form of exclusion of individuals on grounds of
race or color results, of course, in segregation. And such segregation does
not automatically assure equal facilities for the excluded groups. The problem
47. Draper v. St. Louis, 92 F. Supp. 546, 550 (E.D. Mo. 1950).

48. If Myrdal is correct in believing that segregation is in large measure a device
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might be described as that of state enforcement of private discrimination. It
was apparently put at rest by the declaration in the Civil Rights Cases,49 that
discrimination by private individuals was beyond the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But Shelley v. Kraemer reopened the problem by holding that
state courts may not issue an injunction to support uncompelled contractual
undertakings not to allow real estate to be sold to or occupied by negroes. The
result was hard to avoid in the face "of the well-settled determination that
states or their subdivisions were not permitted by legislation to prevent
negroes from living in certain areas. The decision does raise, however, the
broad question whether all private acts of discrimination, depending as they
ultimately do, upon the sanction of the state, are not forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. Professor Hale in two notable articles pursued this
analysis to its ultimate conclusion.50 Perhaps his thesis may be summed up
in the proposition that in civilized society any exercise of rights of property or
contract is possible only to the extent that the force of society stands ready
to make them effective. Professor Hale's only suggestion for a limiting
factor was that the subject matter of the action should be a matter of "high
public interest." 51 But if the viewpoint is taken that racial discrimination is
inherently evil, contributing to a malignant growth in our society, then every
act of discrimination would seem to be a matter of high public concern.
Several recent cases touch upon this issue. One was before the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit-Whitesidev. Southern Bus Lines.5 2 A negro
passenger on an interstate bus trip was asked, when the bus came into
Kentucky, to move from a front seat to a rear seat. Upon her refusal to
comply, the bus driver called a policeman, who put her off. She instituted a
common law action for damages to her person and her property. The court
of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. The
grounds of decision are not too clear. Reliance was placed on the commerce
clause, although no state or local law required the bus company to segregate
its passengers. The court observed that no state action was necessary to
invalidate conduct which burdened interstate commerce. But the court went
on to observe that if state action were required, it was to be found in the
participation of the policeman.53 The interesting point is the suggestion that
49. 109 U.S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835 (1883).
50. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political" and "Econoomic" Compulsion, 35 COL. L. REv. 149 (1935) ; Hale, Rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments against Injuries Inflicted by Private Individuals, 6 LAw. GuiLD REv. 627

(1946).

51. Hale, Rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments against Injuries
Inflicted by Private Individuals, 6 LAW. GUILD REV. 627, 630 (1946), taking the phrase
from Mr. Justice Cardozo in Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88, 52 Sup. Ct. 484, 76 L. Ed.

984 (1932).
52. 177 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1949).

53. A contrary result was reached by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Day
v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 171 F.2d 59 (1948).
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forbidden state action might be involved in the assistance furnished by the
policeman. What is true of public transportation vehicles should be true of
all places of public resort. If a theatre owner calls a policeman to eject a
negro who has succeeded in entering the theatre against the wishes of the
proprietor, are the policeman and proprietor liable in an action of trespass?
The presence of a state statute or local ordinance barring negroes from white
theatres would be forbidden state action. In the absence of such a law, the
justification for the assault upon the negro would be the privilege of the
property owner to exclude from his premises those whom he chose to exclude.
That privilege, of course, is state-conferred. Is it, then, prohibited state action?
The Third Circuit case of Valle v. Stengel54 also comes very close to
presenting the question squarely. A group of negroes and whites had gone
into Pallisades Amusement Park in New Jersey. Several of them had tickets
for the swimming pool. When the rest sought to get tickets, the attendant
refused to sell them to the negroes. Those negroes who did have tickets were
nevertheless denied access to the pool. An argument ensued which was
terminated by the eviction of the patrons by the local chief of police, who had
been summoned by the management. Suit was brought under various provisions of the Civil Rights Acts and the court of appeals held the action wellfounded. Various grounds were relied on. Reference was made to the rarely
invoked provisions forbidding interference with the rights of person to make
and enforce contracts. 55 But these provisions would seem to have been intended to penalize third persons who prevent the making and enforcing of
contracts between willing parties, rather than, as here, to penalize unwilling
parties for refusing to make or perform contracts with negroes. A similar
comment may be made as to the claim that denial of admission to the
swimming pool, upon presentation of a ticket already purchased, was a denial
of the right to lease or hold real or personal property, also protected by the
statute. 56
An additional argument relied upon by the court of appeals was that the
defendants acted under color of law to deny the privileges and immunities
conferred by the Constitution." Plaintiffs were residents of New York,
and thereby of the United States. By New Jersey law, all persons within the
jurisdiction are entitled by equal accommodations and privileges at any place
of public amusement. Since any citizen of New Jersey was entitled to use
the swimming pool, the court reasoned, plaintiffs, as citizens of the United
States, were also entitled to use it. Denial of that right by the police chief
was therefore a denial, under color of state law, of civil rights guaranteed to
54. 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949).
55. REv. STAT. § 1977 (1875), 8 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1942).
56. Rv. STAT. § 1978 (1875), 8 U.S.C.A. § 42 (1942).
57. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 2.
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the plaintiffs by the Fourteenth Amendment. The corporate defendant .and its
managers were retained as parties defendant, one judge dissenting, on the
ground that evidence might support the allegation that they had caused the
unlawful acts of the official. This ground of decision seems somewhat questionable if it be assumed, as was probably the fact, that negro citizens of
New Jersey as well as of other states were being denied access to the swimming
pool.
Another basis for the decision may be suggested. If the law of the state
barred negroes, clearly there would have been a denial of equal protection.
Normally, in the absence of such a law, the holding of the Civil Rights Cases
would appear to preclude federal action against a private landowner who discriminates against negroes in allowing entrance upon and the use of his
property. Normally, also, official assistance may be invoked by the landowner,
without transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment, to effectuate his determination thus to exclude. But in the present situation that privilege of exclusion had been curtailed: the effect of New Jersey's civil rights law was to
prevent operators of places of public amusement from discriminating against
negroes. Lacking the sanction derived from the existence of the privilege
of the property owner, the action of the police chief becomes an arbitrary
interference under color of state law with the exercise of equal rights.
The line of argument gives only limited scope for the invocation of
federal assistance against discrimination motivated solely by the desires of
the private owner. Generally, if there are civil rights statutes in force in
the state, they will afford protection and redress if it is desired. But the
broader basis for intervention is also hinted at in the eighth circuit case
of Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club.58 There the operator of a race track
hired the local sheriff to escort Mr. Watkins from the premises, should be
venture to appear. When he did appear, after duly purchasing a ticket, he was
escorted out by the sheriff. No question of color was involved. The proprietor
apparently had a personal dislike of Watkins' conduct. Watkins sued the club
for damages for false arrest and false imprisonment and the deprivation
of federally protected rights. The complaint was dismissed after trial on
the ground that there was no substantial evidence to support a finding that
the sheriff and his assistants, in ejecting the plaintiff, were acting in an
official capacity. Rather, it was concluded, they were shown to have been
acting only as agents of the club, using reasonable means to evict a person
whose license to be there had been revoked by the owner of the premises. The
court of appeals affirmed on these grounds.
Currently accepted doctrine certainly casts no doubt on the correctness
of the result. The interesting aspect of the case is the narrow ground of
58. 183 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1950).
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decision, with the implication that perhaps the result might have been different
if the sheriff and his assistants had been acting in their official capacity when
they removed Watkins at the request of the operator of the race track. Unlike
the Valle situation, the present one does not involve any state law limiting
the privilege of the landowner to exclude. Is it the ultimate implication
of the Shelley case that a landowner in the last analysis owes to the state any
effective right he may have to exclude unwanted persons from his property
and, therefore, any official action which supports such exclusion is within
the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment? If so, and if the policeman had
been acting in an official capacity, he and the race track operator would have
been subject to suit under whatever of the civil rights statutes might be
construed to fit, or in a common law action in which the obvious defenses
would be disallowed as unconstitutional.
This conclusion, of course, would appear to upset the long-repeated pronouncement of the Civil Rights Cases that the Fourteenth Amendment has
nothing to do with private acts of discrimination.
Before re-examining the Civil Rights Cases, it may be appropriate to see
if there is any earlier stopping point to the holding of the Shelley case. A
possible argument is that the case merely prohibits the use of the injunction
to support private discrimination; that an injunction, being such a unique and
powerful form of judicial intervention, has a special character, akin to legislation. This suggestion is not very persuasive. What an injunction does is
exert state judicial power in a particular way to induce a contracting party
to discharge his obligations. Whether or not an action for damages for breach
of contract would be an equally effective persuader would depend upon a
variety of factors. Such an action could be most effective in the particular kind
of situation here under consideration. A landowner contemplating the sale
of real estate to negroes in violation of a restrictive covenant might well
be deterred by the threat of multiple suits by cocovenantors. There may be
some legal difficulties in the way of proving damages. But that would be
rather meagre comfort, particularly in a community in which judge and jury
could be expected to be hostile to the seller. In the light of the practical problem involved, the distinction between state coercion in the form of an injunction
and state coercion in the form of damage actions seems too trivial to hold.
The Missouri Supreme Court thought it would.50 But Judge Holtzoff, in the
District of Columbia, seems to have been clearly right in rejecting the distinction. He stated the holding of the Shelley case to be "that it was contrary
to the Fourteenth and Fifeenth Amendments to the Constitution and contrary
to public policy to aid in the enforcement of such covenants by judicial pro60
ceedings."
59. Weiss v. Leaon, 225 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. 1949).
60. Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F. Supp. 604 (D.D.C. 1950).
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Judicial enforcement of contractual obligations to discriminate in ways
that would be prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment if required by legislation seems to be banned. The principle might be restated as follows : states are
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment from compelling private individuals
to discriminate, irrespective of whether the obligation to discriminate is
imposed by a legislative command or is voluntarily assumed by entering into a
contract. In the latter case, of course, individual contract rights are frustrated.
But the rights frustrated are somewhat remote: the person most directly
involved is seeking to escape a restraint on his own freedom of action.
This principle is a plausible one upon which to stand in attempting to
delimit the implications of the Shelley case. But even if plausible, there
is the question of whether it goes far enough to serve the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment. But there are other plausible stopping points, short
of a ban upon all private discrimination, which would give greater scop6 to
the Amendment without excessive impairment of the principles of federalism.
Deserving of examination in this connection is the proposition that the
failure by the state to bar discrimination is state action denying the equal
protection of the laws. That state inaction is properly to be regarded as
state action under some circumstances is not a novel idea.01 By general
acceptance, the kind of federal antilynching legislation least vulnerable to
constitutional attack is the assessment of penalties against local officials and
communities by whose connivance or neglect lynchings occur.62 In international law the responsibility of a state for injuries to persons or property
as a result of the inaction of the state and its agencies has long been recognized. Professor Hyde has stated that in presenting claims against foreign
states the United States "has correctly asserted that when any agency of a
territorial sovereign either wantonly or passively fails to use the means at
its disposal to prevent violence or to prosecute the perpetrators, a delinquency
in an international sense is apparent and responsibility for the consequences
And Professor Frank has
of the action of the mob comes into being. .
shown that the members of Congress in 1871 believed that a state denied
equal protection of the laws when it permitted widespread abuses against them
64
because of their color.
".."63

We are here concerned with something more than failure to protect
against violence to person or property. But the concept of equal protection of
the laws involves more. It may be thought to involve the right to be protected
against arbitrary restrictions, like those based on color, wherever the power
61. Cf. Catlette v. United States, 152 F.2d 902, 907 (4th Cir. 1943).
62. See Notes, 47 MicH. L. REv. 369 (1949), 57 YALE L.J. 855 (1948).
63. 2

HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW

UNITED STATES

CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND

APPLIED BY THE

951 (2d ed. 1947).

64. Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws,"

50 COL. L. IEv. 131, 165 (1950).
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of the state reaches. This would mean that a state denied equal protection
to the extent that, in the face of actual discrimination, it failed to exercise
available legislative power to correct it. The Fourteenth Amendment would
then be flouted by a state's failure to pass laws prohibiting discrimination in
private employment, private schools, perhaps private rental housing, and all
places of public accommodation. 65 The measure of the state's obligation would
simply be the limits of its power under due process to prohibit discrimination.
Presumably under this limitation it would still be permissible for a homeowner to exclude all of his negro acquaintances from a garden party. But it
would not be permissible to exclude negroes as such from private rental
housing, schools and employment. In these areas self-enforcement of the equal
protection clause by invalidation of defenses in trespass actions would not be
feasible since contractual understandings must be arrived at. An unwanted
seeker of employment removed from the premises of the employer would
hardly be able to overcome the property owner's defense of his privilege by
pleading discriminatory denial of the chance to become an employee. If this
analysis were accepted, therefore, it would seem to provide at most a basis for
federal legislation.
Such a broad extension of the area to which the concept of equal protection applies is obviously open to attack. It hardly fell within the contemplation
of the draftsmen that the owner of rental real estate would be prohibited, by
force of the Amendment, from selecting and rejecting tenants on any basis,
however arbitrary.
It is not so easy to brush aside the suggestion that the equal protection
of the laws means the right to be free of restrictions upon access to places
of public resort. The proprietor who selects individually those with whom he
will deal is in a quite different position from the proprietor who throws open
his doors to the public at large. The latter would seem to have foregone his
right to pick and choose by deliberately seeking the more extensive patronage
which will be attracted by wide-open doors. For a state to permit such a
person to exclude solely on the basis of color would seem to be a denial of
equal protection. Hotels, restaurants, inns, taverns, stores, theatres, places
of recreation and public carriers fall within this class. Yet there is under
state law a widely accepted differentiation within the class. Unless a franchise
has been granted, the right of the owner arbitrarily to exclude individuals
from a place thrown open to the public at large has been recognized. 60 Since
the equal protection clause goes beyond discrimination on the basis of color
65. State civil rights laws are collected in KoNvrrz, Tim

CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL

(1947).
66. See Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697 (1947);
cf. Powell v. Utz, 87 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Wash. 1949); Nash v. Air Terminal Service,
85 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Va. 1949).
RIGHTS
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and covers all arbitrary discrimination against individuals, 67 it is arguable
that the state's infraction would exist only with respect to those enterprises
which under state law are forbidden to exclude individuals on an arbitrary
basis. Yet for constitutional purposes, the state distinction could reasonably
be ignored, and the state's obligation measured by the broader class.
Whether the equal protection clause be construed to stand in the way of
racial discrimination by enterprises which by state law are required to be
available to all who present themselves, or by all places of public resort,
the question of conflict with the Civil Rights Cases arises. The proposition
of law announced in those cases was that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
confer upon the Federal Government the power to prohibit discrimination by
private persons. The holding of the case, while far from clear, is certainly
less broad. Some language in the opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley states quite
plainly that the effect of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was merely to
authorize federal legislation which would render null and void state laws which,
contrary to section 2, required establishments to discriminate on grounds
of color.08 Yet the decision appears to have been predicated upon the assump-

tion that state laws did require equal access for all: "Inkeepers and public
carriers, by the laws of all the States, so far as we are aware, are bound, to
the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper accommodations to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for them." 69 Bradley then continued with the observation that if the state laws themselves made any unjust
discrimination, Congress had power to afford a remedy. Elsewhere, assuming
that admission to a public place is the right of, all classes of men, he asked,
"is the Constitution violated until the denial of the right has some State
sanction or authority?"70 Again, in the famous passage declaring that the
Amendment was intended only to remedy a denial of rights, "for which the
States alone were or could be responsible," Bradley stated: "civil rights ...
cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals unsupported by State
authority.... [R]ights remain in full force and may presumably be vindicated
by resort to the laws of the State ....-71 It appears, therefore, that he did
not address himself to the question here being considered, as to the situation
in the absence of state legislation. What Bradley appeared to fear most was
the Federal Government's taking over the job of enforcing all rights of
every character, irrespective of their recognition or enforcement by the states;
an entire machinery superimposed on, and largely superseding, that of the
67. Burt v. New York, 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946).
68. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 13, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835 (1883).
69. Id. at 25. Bradley did not refer to the status of theatres, which were involved in
one of the cases.
70. Id. at 24.

71. Id. at 17.
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states. The statute was stricken down because it "applies equally to cases
arising in States which have the justest laws respecting the personal rights
of citizens and whose authorities are ever ready to enforce such laws, and to
those which arise in States that may have violated the prohibition of the
Amendment." 72
The Civil Rights Cases may continue to stand for the proposition that
general federal action is not authorized to prohibit private persons from
discriminating on the ground of color. The decision does not appear to
stand in the way of federal legislation limited to those states where color
is a tolerated basis of exclusion from places traditionally open to the public
at large.
No attempt seems to have been made to explore the -way in which such
federal legislation might be appropriately limited in scope to meet the objections explicitly raised in the opinion. Granted that a need for federal
action must be shown, how is it to be shown? Would a Congressional finding
not wholly devoid of plausibility suffice? Or would the Court, because of
the issues of federalism at stake, insist upon the closer scrutiny usually
given to legislation restricting civil rights? Assuming a need in some states,
how is the application of the statute to be limited to those states? These
questions should be examined further. The recent court of appeals cases
discussed above reflect a new ferment of ideas stimulated by the Screws and
Shelley cases. The time has come for reconsideration of the scope of federal
power to cut down discrimination in places of public resort. The foregoing
discussion has the very limited purpose of suggesting avenues to be explored
and suggesting that the Civil Rights Cases do not present as large an obstacle
as is commonly assumed.
Sociologists have rejected the old concept, enshrined in William Graham
Sumner's Folkways, published in 1906, that law must come from the mores,
and cannot go beyond them. It is now generally accepted that legal action,
within limits, can influence ways of living. 73 Dramatic demonstrations of
the validity of the present concepts have been furnished by the extension of
negro suffrage in the South and by the enlargement of federal protection of
bodily security under the drive of Supreme Court decisions broadening the
reach of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Equally important are
the current steps to destroy the pattern of second-class education for negroes,
whether they are to be limited to rigorous insistence on equality in educational
facilities or enlarged to upset the entire concept of segregation. The commerce clause has proved an effective tool for breaking down the barriers
72. Id. at 14.
73. See generally, WILLIAMS, THE REDUCTION OF INTERGROUP TENSIONS (SoC.

Res. Council Bull. 57, 1947).
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of discrimination and segregation in interstate transportation, 74 and it appears
to be adequate for this purpose in the case of employment. 75 It has been
suggested here that the possibility exists for effective action in other areas.
The possibility should not be foreclosed by a return to a grudging, restrictive
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
74. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816, 70 Sup. Ct. 843, 94 L. Ed.
1302 (1950) ; Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 66 Sup. Ct. 1050, 90 L. Ed. 1317 (1946).
The latest important federal case-Chance v. Lambeth, 186 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1951)
-is the subject of a comment, infra p. 689, which collects and analyzes the authorities.
75. See Hyman, ConstitutionalAspects of the Covenant, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
451, 475-76 (1949) ; Hunt, The Proposed Fair Employment Practices Act; Facts and
Fallacies,32 VA. L. Rsv. 1, 3-4 (1945). Cf. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192,
65 Sup. Ct. 226, 89 L. Ed. 173 (1944) ; Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).

